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We characterize the equilibrium of a search model with a continuum of job and worker types, 
wage bargaining, free entry of vacancies and on-the-job search. The decentralized economy 
with monopsonistic wage setting yields too many vacancies and hence too low unemployment 
compared to first best. This is due to a business-stealing externality. Raising workers’ 
bargaining power resolves this inefficiency. Unemployment benefits are a second best 
alternative to this policy. We establish simple relations between the losses in production due 
to search frictions and wage differentials on the one hand and unemployment on the other 
hand. Both can be used for empirical testing. 
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Two out of every three jobs among young workers end within a year and the bulk of those
separations reﬂect job-to-job changes rather than layoﬀs, see Topel and Ward (1992).1
This suggests that there are search or information frictions in the labor market that
prevent worker types to immediately match with their optimal job type. Any model that
aims to give a good description of actual labor market ﬂows should therefore allow for
job-to-job transitions. This paper incorporates on-the-job search into a matching model
with a continuum of worker and job types.
Incorporating two-sided heterogeneity into a search model is useful because one of
the most important functions of the labor market is to ﬁnd the right man for the job.
This optimal assignment problem obviously depends on the production technology. We
assume log supermodularity so that high skilled workers have a comparative advantage
in complex jobs. Then, a well functioning labor market sorts low skilled workers into the
simple jobs and high skilled workers into complex jobs. Search frictions frustrate this
process and make the assignment of workers to jobs imperfect.
This approach generates strong testable implications. If wages are determined by
Nash bargaining, they should for a given skill type be concave in job complexity: workers
earn most at their optimal assignment and earn less the further they are away from their
optimal assignment. Gautier and Teulings (2004) show that this is indeed the case for
the 6 OECD countries they consider. For the US, the cost of search frictions as a share of
total production is in the order of 25%. Alternatively, the cost of search can be derived
from the natural rate of unemployment. If the match surplus is shared equally and there
is no on-the-job search, unemployment, mismatch and the cost of vacancy creation each
make up for one third of the cost of search, see Teulings and Gautier (2004). Hence,
a natural rate of 5% implies that the cost of search is 15%, which is considerably less
than the 25% derived from the concavity of wages. On-the-job search can resolve this
inconsistency because it makes unemployed workers less choosy about their ﬁrst job and
as a result the unemployment rate falls. The cost of search therefore becomes more than
three times the unemployment rate. On-the-job search also increases wage diﬀerentials
for workers with equal skill levels, mainly because unemployed job seekers increase the
range of job types that is acceptable for them. Therefore, the ratio of the cost of search
1Only for workers with less than a year of labor market experience the lay-oﬀ rate is larger than the
job-to-job transition rate.
1and wage diﬀerentials is lower with on-the-job search.
Finally, allowing for on-the-job search yields new empirical predictions regarding the
tenure distribution as a function of the quality of the match. This research program
results in a more reliable empirically backed estimate of the importance of search frictions
for the labor market.
On-the-job search also has important implications for eﬃciency. We ﬁnd that when
oﬀ- and on-the-job search are equally eﬃcient, unemployed job seekers accept all jobs that
pay more than the value of leisure and employed workers accept all jobs with a higher
wage than their current one. Therefore, workers behave socially optimally irrespective of
their bargaining power. In addition, we impose that vacancies do not cause congestion
on each other with respect to the meeting rate of possible job candidates. We show
that even then, ﬁrms create too many vacancies in the decentralized equilibrium due to
a business-stealing eﬀect. When opening a vacancy, ﬁrms do not internalize the output
losses that a job switcher imposes on her previous employer. We ﬁnd that this externality
is non-monotonic in the degree of search frictions. Starting from a situation with high
frictions, excess vacancy supply increases as search frictions become smaller. However,
for very low frictions, excess vacancy supply reduces again and in the limiting case of no
search frictions the measure of vacancies reduces to zero. Those results do not depend on
our speciﬁc contact technology. A constant returns contact technology only introduces
additional (congestion) externalities without eliminating the business-stealing externality
of the present paper.
The implications of on-the-job search for wage bargaining in search models have been
debated recently in Shimer (2005). Without on-the-job search, a larger piece of the cake
for the worker implies an equivalently smaller piece for the ﬁrm. This symmetry breaks
down when there is on-the-job search because the expected match duration is increasing
in the wage. Hence, ﬁrms are willing to pay a no-quit premium for good matches. This
makes the set of feasible pay oﬀs of ﬁrms and workers possibly non-convex. Shimer shows
that a strategic bargaining game in the spirit of Rubinstein (1982) may generate multiple
equilibria and that the wage that maximizes the product of worker and ﬁrm surpluses is
always an equilibrium. However, local maxima are also equilibria in his strategic game.
In this paper we also have potential non-convexities in the pay oﬀs set. For many of the
special simplifying cases that we focus on, i.e. ﬁrms have all the bargaining power, those
problems do not occur.
2The analysis of a model with hierarchical two-sided sorting is a complicated aﬀair.
In particular, the lower left and upper right corner of the matching space of skill and
complexity levels cause serious analytical problems. Teulings and Gautier (2004) approx-
imated the equilibrium for the model without on-the-job search by Taylor expansions
around the Walrasian assignment. This approach turned out not to work when we add
on-the-job search. Hence, we take a more convenient approach here. In Gautier et al.
(2005), we show that the approximated equilibrium in the hierarchical model has roughly
the same properties as the equilibrium of the circular model of Marimon and Zilibotti
(1999) with an increasing returns to scale contact technology. Since the circular model is
simpler than the hierarchical model, we introduce on-the-job search in the circular model.
There are a number of papers that are related to this one. Pissarides (1994) also studies
on-the-job search in a matching framework. His model diﬀers from ours in at least 3 ways:
(1) he considers identical workers and two job types while we consider a continuum of
diﬀerent workers and jobs, (2) unlike Pissarides’ model in our model the diﬀerent worker
types do not cause congestion on each other, (3) in our model, wages either maximize the
Nash product or are an equilibrium to an alternating oﬀer game while Pissarides assumes
a linear sharing rule. Barlevy (2002) has a model that is very similar to ours except that
in his model, wages are determined by a linear sharing rule, he uses a diﬀerent contact
technology and his main results are based on simulations where we present analytical
solutions. His focus also diﬀers from ours. He makes the important point that the
sullying eﬀect of recessions (workers move slower to their optimal job types because of
low vacancy creation in recessions) dominates the positive cleansing eﬀect of recessions for
realistic parameter values. As in Jovanovic (1979, 1984), our model predicts individual
separation probabilities to be decreasing in job tenure because the good matches are the
ones that survive. In a companion paper we give empirical evidence for this. Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) show that worker and job heterogeneity is not necessary for job-to-
job-movements. They show that the trade oﬀ between higher proﬁts and a larger hiring
probability leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium for the ﬁrms. Finally, on-the-job search
in a bargaining environment is studied in Gautier (2002), Moscarini (2002, 2005), Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002) and Burdett et al. (2004) but these papers either do not consider
ex ante heterogeneity or assume a diﬀerent bargaining environment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with the assumptions and de-
rives the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. In this section,
3we consider three cases: (i) no on-the-job search and positive bargaining power for the
workers, (ii) on- and oﬀ-the-job search equally eﬃcient and ﬁrms have all the bargaining
power, (iii) on-the-job search is less eﬃcient than oﬀ-the-job search and ﬁrms have all the
bargaining power. In Section 4 we conduct welfare analysis for those cases. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
The economy that we consider has the following properties.
Production
There is a continuum of worker types s and job types c; s and c are locations on a circle
with circumference 1, so that s = 1 is equivalent to s = 0, and the same for c. Workers can
only produce output when matched to a job. The productivity Y of a match only depends
on, the ”distance” between s and c: x(s,c) = mink∈Z |s − c + k|. Hence: Y = Y (x). We
assume that Y (x) is twice diﬀerentiable and globally concave: Yxx(x) < 0, with an interior
maximum. Without loss of generality, this maximum is located at x = 0 and the value
of the maximum is normalized to unity: Y (0) = 1. Hence, x is a measure of the degree
of mismatch of an assignment. These assumptions imply that Yx (0) = 0, since x = 0
maximizes Y (x). We consider the simplest functional form that meets those criteria.





We are interested in non-trivial equilibria where workers do not accept all jobs.2 The
parameter γ is related to the complexity dispersion parameter discussed in Teulings and
Gautier (2004: 558) and Teulings (2005). Low values of γ imply that worker types are
close substitutes.
Labor supply
We assume that labor supply per s-type is uniformly distributed over the circumference
of the circle and that, without loss of generality, total labor supply is normalized to one.
Hence, the density of type s is also equal to one. Unemployed workers receive a value of
leisure B. Employed workers supply a ﬁxed amount of labor and their pay oﬀ is equal to
the wage they receive.
2This requires Y (x) < 0 for at least some x. Since 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2, a suﬃcient condition is γ > 8.
4Labor demand
There is free entry of vacancies for all c-types. The ﬂow cost of maintaining a vacancy is
equal to K per period. After a vacancy is ﬁlled, the ﬁrm only pays for the wage of the
worker.
Job search technology
We assume a quadratic contact technology. Under these assumptions, the contact rate of
an unemployed worker is:
λ(s,unemployed)→c = λv (c),
and for a worker employed in a z-type job with a vacancy of type c it equals:
λ(s,employed in z)→c = ψλv (c)
where v (c) denotes the density of vacancies of type c per unit of the labor force and
where 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 and λ > 0. The parameter ψ measures the eﬃciency of on-the-job
search relative to search while unemployed; ψ = 0 is the case with no on-the-job search,
as analyzed in Teulings and Gautier (2004); ψ = 1 is the case where oﬀ- and on-the-job
search are equally eﬃcient. Since each contact between a particular type of worker with
a particular job is at the same time a contact of a particular job with a particular type
of worker, the contact rates of job types must therefore satisfy:
λc→(s,unemployed) = λu(s)
λc→(s,employed in z) = ψλe(s,z)
where u(s) denotes the density of unemployed workers of type s and where e(s,c) denotes
the density of type s workers employed in job type c, both per unit of the labor force. The
quadratic contact technology implies increasing returns to scale (IRS) and the absence of
congestion externalities: the number of unemployed u(s) or employed job seekers e(s,c)
does not enter into the contact rate for (un)employed workers and mutatis mutandis the
same applies for the number of vacancies v (c) in the contact rate of vacancies. Hence,
we can interpret the eﬃciency parameter λ as the scale of the labor market. The search
process is more eﬃcient when the scale of the market is larger. The limiting case, λ →
∞, yields the Walrasian equilibrium. Teulings and Gautier (2004) give a number of
motivations for the IRS assumption. The main motivation is that it avoids congestion
eﬀects between workers with very diﬀerent skills. Another motivation is that it simpliﬁes
the model.
5Job separation
Matches between workers and jobs are destroyed at rate δ > 0.
Wage setting
We assume that wages are determined by bargaining between the worker and the ﬁrm
while ﬁrms cannot commit on future wage payments. Shimer (2005) argues that the
axiomatic Nash bargaining solution can no longer be applied in the presence of on-the-
job search because of non-convexities in the set of feasible pay oﬀs. He shows that any
wage that locally maximizes the product of worker and ﬁrm surplus is an equilibrium
to a strategic game where workers and ﬁrms make alternating oﬀers and the breakdown
rate goes to zero. We assume here that wages are set according to such a game. The
combination of bargaining and on-the-job search brings our model close to the wage
posting literature, i.e. Burdett and Mortensen (1988), and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2003).
In both frameworks, ﬁrms pay ”no-quit” premiums, but only in the wage posting models
ﬁrms pay ”hiring premiums” (i.e. premiums that result in higher acceptance probabilities
from the worker side). In bargaining models where wages are continuously renegotiated,
hiring premiums are not credible because they will be immediately eliminated after hiring.
Workers anticipate this, and will therefore not respond to such premiums. Hence, ﬁrms
will not oﬀer them in the ﬁrst place.
Golden-growth path
We study the economy while it is on a golden-growth path, where the discount rate ρ > 0
is equal to the growth rate of the labor force. This assumption is only made for reasons
of tractability: it allows for an analytical solution of an integral which otherwise would
have to be computed numerically.3 Since the quadratic matching function implies IRS,
the growth of the labor force implies an upward trend in the eﬃciency of the search
process. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is an oﬀsetting downward trend
in the eﬃciency of the market so that λ remains constant and the labor market does not
continuously become more eﬃcient over time.4
3This problem also arises in wage posting models. The usual assumption made in these models is that
ρ/δ is inﬁnitesimal (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). The same assumption would also be helpful in our
model, but we have chosen for the alternative representation of a golden-growth path.
4We can think of λ as consisting of a size-of-the-market part and a search eﬃciency part. We assume
that the product of both remains constant over time.
6Strategies of workers
Workers accept any job oﬀer that yields a larger present value than the current job. If
workers receive a wage oﬀer equal to their current wage they move with strictly positive
probability to the new ﬁrm.5
Strategies of the ﬁrms
A ﬁrm’s strategy is an entry decision and conditional on entering, a location on the unit
circle. We assume that ﬁrms do not know the realizations of the strategies of the other
ﬁrms and the realized matches. This implies that strategies can only be based on the
steady-state distribution of worker and ﬁrm locations. We consider the vacancy suppliers
to be ex ante identical and consider symmetric equilibria (identical ﬁrms play the same
strategy). Non-symmetric equilibria might exist but require a lot of coordination. Pure-
strategy equilibria do not exist in this setting because that would imply that all vacancies
would be located at the same spot. This cannot be an equilibrium since a single ﬁrm is
able to improve proﬁts by posting vacancies at the other side of the circle.6 This implies
that we do not have to consider these pure-strategy equilibria.
In Gautier et al. (2005), we proof that given that the labor force is distributed uni-
formly along the circumference of the circle, vacancies must also be distributed uniformly:
v (c) = v. This proof is based on the assumption that there is no on-the-job search. We
will show that when we allow for on-the-job search, this uniform distribution of vacancies
is again an equilibrium, but we cannot proof that no other equilibria exist. However, we
do conjecture that the uniqueness result carries over to the case where ψ > 0. The intu-
ition behind this is that wages should be high at locations with relatively many vacancies.
This is due to both the increase in the outside option of the unemployed workers and
the increase in the ”no-quit” premium. The high wages at these locations suggest that
the value of a vacancy is relatively low there which violates the assumption of free entry.
Hence, a situation where some locations have more vacancies than others cannot be an
equilibrium. Since we focus on equilibria where both supply and demand are uniformly
distributed, all outcome variables do not depend on either s or c separately, but only
on the distance x between them. Hence, we use x as the only argument. For variables
depending only on either s or c, like v (c), we simply drop the argument. This simpliﬁes
5If indiﬀerent workers were not to move, the vacancy distribution would become degenerate, see Shimer
(2005).
6A formal proof of this can be obtained upon request.
7notation considerably.
2.1 Derivation of the equilibrium
Let b V E (W) be the asset value of holding a job paying a wage W and let b V (W) be the
number of vacancies that pay a wage equal to or higher than W. The asset value b V E (W)
satisﬁes the following Bellman equation:
ρb V
E (W) = W + δ
h
V
















ρ + δ + ψλb V (W)
i−1
where V U is the asset value of unemployment. Throughout the paper, subscripts of
functions denote the relevant (partial) derivative. A suﬃcient condition for equilibrium
is that the wage W (x) paid to an s-type worker employed in a job of type c = s ± x
maximizes the following product:7








Y (x) − W
ρ + δ + ψλb V (W)
#1−β
The ﬁrst factor in square brackets is the increase in wealth for the worker relative to the
status of unemployment, the second factor is the increase in wealth for the ﬁrm. The latter
is the current income stream Y (x) − W divided by a modiﬁed discount rate, accounting
for the interest rate ρ, the separation rate δ, and the quit rate of the worker to better paid
jobs, ψλb V (W). By paying higher wages, ﬁrms and workers reduce the probability that
the worker quits to a better paying job. This increases the Nash product in the present
job. Hence, ﬁrms pay a no-quit premium which raises the wage above the simple sharing
rule that applies in models without on-the-job search, see also Shimer (2005).
The wage oﬀer distribution, b V ( ), can have no mass point in W. If b V ( ) would have
a mass point at W ∗, then the surplus product would jump upward by a slight increase
in W above W ∗, since all vacancies at the mass points would no longer be able to poach
a worker from the job paying this slightly higher wage. This contradicts W ∗ being a
maximum of the surplus product. Since the surplus product is continuous in W and since
7Since at this stage we cannot rule out that the set of feasible pay oﬀs is non-convex we cannot use
the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution. Our solution is consistent with Shimer’s alternating oﬀer game
where we interpret the β′s either as diﬀerent discount factors or as probabilities to make an oﬀer.
8both Y (x) − W (x) and b V E [W (x)] − V U are positive (otherwise, either the ﬁrm or the
worker would not be willing to match), W (x) satisﬁes the following ﬁrst order condition:
β [Y (x) − W (x)] = (1 − β)
h
b V





ρ + δ + ψλb V [W (x)] + ψλb VW [W (x)][Y (x) − W (x)]
i
This condition states that the gain from a marginal wage increase for the worker is equal
to the cost of that increase for the ﬁrm, where both are weighted by their respective
bargaining power β and 1 − β. Since Y (x) is decreasing in the distance x, W (x) is
decreasing in x. Hence, we can deﬁne the number of vacancies and the asset value of a
job as functions of x instead of W:
V (x) ≡ b V [W (x)]
V
E (x) ≡ b V
E [W (x)]
V (x) is now the number of vacancies located at a shorter distance to worker type s than x.
These vacancies therefore oﬀer a higher wage than W (x). Since vacancies are distributed
uniformly over the circumference, V (x) does not depend on s. Similarly, V E (x) is the
asset value of holding a job at distance x from the optimal type c = s. By the chain rule,
we get:
2v ≡ b VW [W (x)]Wx (x)
V
E
x (x) ≡ b V
E
W [W (x)]Wx (x)
In the ﬁrst equation we use the uniform distribution of vacancies: the density of vacancies
of type c is v. The factor 2 comes in because increasing x adds a vacancy both to the
left and to the right of the optimal type c = s. Substitution of these expressions and the





2γx2 − W (x)
￿￿




2γx2 − W (x)
￿
− (1 − β)[V E (x) − V U](ρ + δ + 2ψλvx)
. (1)
The asset value for an unemployed job seeker satisﬁes the Bellman equation:
ρV





E (x) − V
U￿
dx (2)
where x is the maximum distance of a job oﬀer that is acceptable for an unemployed job
seeker. For interpretation, x is also the probability that a job oﬀer is acceptable for an
9unemployed worker. Similarly, the asset value for an s-type worker holding a job of type
c = s ± x satisﬁes the Bellman equation:
ρV











E (x) − V
U￿
(3)
The disadvantage of writing the asset value this way is that it yields an implicit equation














(ρ + δ + 2ψλvz)
2dz (4)
where the ﬁrst term is the discounted wage income at the current job. The discount factor
consists of a time preference term, ρ, and two terms that take into account the rate at
which a match ends. This happens either by exogenous shocks, δ, or if the worker ﬁnds a
better job 2ψλvx. The number of better job types is given by 2vx (the worker can accept
jobs both to the left and to the right of her favorite job type) and the rate at which the
worker meets those jobs is ψλ. The second term is the probability to move to the state
of unemployment times the properly discounted value of this state and the ﬁnal term is
the probability to ﬁnd a better job times the discounted expected wage at this better job.
For the latter discount factor we have to take into account that both the transition rate
and the new state are discounted at rate (ρ + δ + 2ψλvx)
−1. Substitution of this explicit











2γx2 − W (x)
￿















This is a diﬀerential equation in x. Its solution requires an initial condition. At the
marginal job, x = x, the surplus from matching is zero and hence neither the worker nor
the ﬁrm gains from matching. Hence,






































Note that all these relations depend on the composite parameter κ, not on its separate
components, ρ, δ, and λ.
Let E(x) be the number of individuals of type s that are employed in jobs that are
located at greater distances from s than x, and that are therefore less attractive than a
job at distance x. Hence, E (0) is total employment of type s, and E (x) = 0, since there
is no employment located at a distance greater than x. Since the density of labor supply
is normalized to unity, the rate of unemployment satisﬁes:
u = 1 − E (0)
The equilibrium ﬂow condition for employed workers at distance x or less from their
favorite job is:
2λvx[u + ψE (x)] = (ρ + δ)[E (0) − E (x)]
The left-hand side is the number of people that ﬁnd such a job, partly from unemployment
(the ﬁrst term in square brackets), partly by mobility from a less attractive job (the second
term). The latter number is downweighted by the factor ψ, reﬂecting the eﬀectiveness of
on-the-job search. The right-hand side is the number of people that lose such a job and
the growth of the number of people that hold such a job due to the growth of the labor
force as a whole: the number of jobs at distance smaller than x, E (0) − E (x), times the
separation rate δ plus the growth rate ρ. Mobility within the segment E (x) of jobs that
are at smaller distance than x is irrelevant for this purpose, because the disappearance of
the old job and the emergence of the new job cancel. Setting x = x yields the equilibrium
ﬂow condition for unemployment:
2λvux = (ρ + δ)E (0)
















By the free entry condition for ﬁrms, the option value of a vacancy of type c must be




[u + ψE (x)]
1 − 1
2γx2 − W(x)











The ﬁrst factor in the integrand on the ﬁrst line is the eﬀective number of individuals
willing to accept a vacancy of type x. It equals the number of unemployed plus the number
of workers presently employed at greater distance than x. By the uniform distribution of
workers and jobs, the latter number is equal to the number of workers of type s employed
in jobs at a greater distance from s than x. The second factor is the value of a ﬁlled
vacancy. Just as in the wage equation, we discount current revenue Y (x)−W (x) by the
discount rate plus the separation rate δ plus the quit rate ψλV (x). The second line follows
from substitution of the relations for employment and unemployment. Note that again
these relations depend on the composite parameter κ, not on its separate components, ρ,
δ, and λ.
Deﬁnition 1 The equilibrium consists of the set {Wx (x),W (x),ρV U,v,x} satisfying
(5) - (8) and (11). The unemployment rate u can be solved as a post-endogenous variable
from equation (9).
3 Characterization of the equilibrium
This section characterizes the equilibrium for 3 cases. Section 3.1 brieﬂy discusses the
case without on-the-job search, ψ = 0, 0 ≤ β < 1. This case serves as a benchmark.
Section 3.2 considers the monopsony model where on- and oﬀ-the-job search are equally
eﬃcient, ψ = 1, β = 0. The case of equal eﬃciency has the advantage that the derivation
12of the reservation wage of an unemployed job seeker becomes trivial: it is simply equal to
the value of leisure, W (x) = B. Unemployed workers simply accept any job paying more
than B. Finally, Section 3.3 discusses the more general case 0 < ψ < 1,β = 0. We show
that the two previous models are just special cases of the more complex model presented
in Section 3.3. The general case 0 < ψ < 1,0 < β < 1 is hard to analyze analytically,
since an explicit solution for the wage function W (x) is not available. We return to this
case in Section 4.2.
3.1 The case without on-the-job search: ψ = 0,0 ≤ β < 1
In order to compare the results with the hierarchical model of Teulings and Gautier
(2004) we ﬁrst solve the model for the case without on-the-job search, ψ = 0,0 ≤ β < 1.
Equations (5) till (8) simplify considerably:








+ (1 − β)ρV
U (12)
ρV


















In the ﬁrst equation we use the fact that Wx (x)  = 0. Hence, since the numerator on
the right-hand side of equation (5) equals zero, this equation has a solution only if the
denominator is also equal to zero. Rearranging terms yields the ﬁrst equation above.
This equation shows that wages are a simple weighted average of the worker’s outside
option, ρV U, and the productivity of the job, Y (x), so that workers receive a share β and
ﬁrms a share 1 − β of the match surplus. This simple linear sharing rule of the match
surplus holds only without on-the-job search because with on-the-job search, ﬁrms start
paying no-quit premiums, giving rise to the type of diﬀerential equations discussed in the
previous section. The second equation combines (6) - (8) and implies that the ﬂow value
of unemployment, ρV U, is equal to the reservation wage of the unemployed, W (x). Again,
this equality holds only without on-the-job search. With on-the-job search, workers retain
a share ψ of the option value of search, so that accepting a job becomes less costly. This
raises the ﬂow value of unemployment above the reservation wage. The asset value of
unemployment (7) reduces to:
13ρV








2 − W (x)
￿





This is a similar expression as the Taylor expansion in Teulings and Gautier (2004, Propo-
sition 2). However, in this model the relationship is exact and not an approximation.
Three additional assumptions made in this paper allow the exact calculation of V U. First,
we apply a circular instead of a hierarchical representation of heterogeneity. Second, the
skill distribution is uniform while it can take any form in Teulings and Gautier (2004).
Third, Y (x) is a quadratic function.
Proposition 2 For the case ψ = 0, β > 0 the equilibrium in u and x for the model is
characterized by the following equations:












u5/2 (1 − β)









Proof: First, we substitute the (steady-state) relationship v = (1−u)/(uκx) into equation
(16) to obtain equation (14). Using ρV U = W (x) = 1− 1






Substitution of (14) into equation (11) and rewriting results in equation (15). 
Equations (14) and (15) form a system of equations that yield solutions for x and u.
Though the model has four structural parameters, K,B,γ, and κ (apart from the bar-
gaining power, β, and the relative eﬃciency of on-the-job search, ψ), the solution depends
on only two composite parameters, B∗ and K∗. This feature applies for all other equilibria
with diﬀerent parameter values of β and ψ considered throughout the paper.
Proposition 3 For K∗ < 2
3
√
2(1 − β) there exists a unique equilibrium with a positive
supply of vacancies.
14Proof: The left-hand side of equation (15) is upward sloping and equal to zero when
u = 0. Substitution of u = 1 in equation (15) and using the mean value theorem yields
the critical value for K∗. For lower values of K∗, this equation has a single root. 
For K∗ larger than the critical value, we obtain the trivial equilibrium where no vacancies
are opened and everybody is unemployed. All results we have obtained so far for the
circular model correspond exactly to those obtained for the hierarchical model of Teulings
and Gautier (2004). This raises hope that a similar equivalence applies for the model with
on-the-job search.
Our comparative statics results are summarized in Table 1. The details can be found in
Appendix A.2. Apart from two ambiguities, we derive general conclusions with respect to
the comparative statics. The exceptions are the ﬁrst order derivatives of v with respect to
γ and κ. The ∩-sign implies that the ﬁrst order derivative is positive for small levels of K∗
and negative for larger values and the ∪-sign implies the opposite situation. Essentially,
the sign of this derivative only depends on the level of the unemployment rate, which
has a positive relationship with K∗. For levels of u smaller than (−2β +
p
6β)/(3 − 2β),
the relationship between v and κ is negative, while the relationship between v and γ is
positive. The turning point is the same for γ and κ. It is increasing in β, being equal to
0 for β = 0 and equal to −2 +
√
6 ≃ 0.45 for β = 1. In parenthesis, we give the expected
sign for realistic values of the unemployment rate. Even for very small levels of β (i.e. 10
percent) the unemployment rate should be over 20% to falsify these expected signs of v
and κ and v and γ, which is an irrelevant range for most western economies.
Table 1: Comparative statics of the model for β > 0 and ψ = 0. A +-sign indicates that
the ﬁrst order derivative is positive
u x v
γ + − ∩ (+)
κ − − ∪ (−)
B + − −
K + + −
153.2 Monopsony with on- and oﬀ-the-job search equally eﬃcient:
ψ = 1,β = 0
With on-the-job search, the equilibrium characterization becomes considerably more com-
plicated. One useful simpliﬁcation is the case where on- and oﬀ-the-job-search are equally
eﬃcient. In that case unemployed workers do not give up any option value of continued
search so their reservation wage simply becomes equal to B. The following Proposition
characterizes the equilibrium for this case.
Proposition 4 For the case ψ = 1,β = 0, wages are given by:




















where f(u) is deﬁned as:














Proof: Equation (17) is a trivial application of the proof of Proposition 6 to be discussed
in Section 3.3. Equation (19) can be obtained by solving the integral in equation (11)
and using the steady-state relationship (9). 
The wage equation (17) is dramatically diﬀerent from (12) for the case without on-the-job
search. In the latter case, a simple linear sharing rule applies where wages are a weighted
average of the outside option of the ﬁrm and the reservation wage of the worker. Then,
the ﬂatness of productivity in the optimal assignment implies the ﬂatness of the wage
function at that point: Wx (0) = Yx (0) = 0. This characteristic does not carry over to the
equilibrium with on-the-job search. The situation is sketched in Figure 1. We draw W (x)
both for ψ = 0 (no on-the-job search) and ψ = 1. The locus of value added Y (x) does
















                                                       
 
with on-the-job search
Figure 1: The wages paid by ﬁrms as a function of the levels of x. The parameters used
are γ = 12,B = 0.2,K = 0.1,κ = 10 and ψ = 1,β = 0 for the case with on-the-job search
while ψ = 0,β = 0.5 for the case without on-the-job search.
workers retain part of the option value of search so that accepting a job is less costly
and matching sets become larger. Firms pay ”no-quit” premiums to avoid workers being
poached by other ﬁrms. The premium of one ﬁrm induces other ﬁrms to pay even higher
premiums in equilibrium. As a consequence, the wage locus is non-diﬀerentiable at the
optimal assignment x = 0, leading to a peak in the locus. Since all ﬁrms pay ”no-quit”
premiums, they have no net eﬀect on actual quit behavior. So even though ﬁrms compete
for workers by paying ”no-quit” premiums, the actual mobility pattern is unaﬀected by
these premiums: workers keep on moving towards the optimal assignment, x = 0. Any
vacancy type with a lower x than the present job will be accepted.
The remarkable consequence of this argument is that the instantaneous proﬁt margin
for an employed worker, Y (x) − W (x), does not reach its maximum at the optimal
assignment, x = 0: while Yx (0) = 0, W +
x (0) < 0 (and the reverse for the left derivative).
Hence, an ε deviation leads to a rise in the surplus. The eﬀect of on-the-job search on
W (x) is undetermined. Since reservation wages are lower with on-the-job search, wages
for similar jobs can be either lower or higher: the no-quit premium pushes wages up, the
lower reservation wages pulls them down.
17Equation (19) for the unemployment rate can be directly compared to equation (15)
for the model without on-the-job search. The right-hand side of both equations is the
same. Surprisingly, the unemployment rate is determined by exactly the same structural
parameters in both models, and these parameters carry the same relative weight. However,
the sensitivity of the unemployment rate with respect to changes in these parameters
diﬀers, in the following order:
1. monopsony without on-the-job search, ψ = 0,β = 0
2. monopsony with on-the-job search, ψ = 1,β = 0
3. Nash bargaining without on-the-job search, ψ = 0,0 < β < 1.
With on-the-job search, the direct eﬀect of an increase in κ on unemployment is
partially oﬀset by the stronger competition between ﬁrms for workers. This pushes up the
”no-quit” premium, reducing ex post proﬁts and hence decreases the supply of vacancies.
Without on-the-job search and positive β, workers become choosier as κ increases which
also dampens the decrease in unemployment.
Proposition 5 For K∗ < 2
3
√
2 there exists a unique equilibrium with a positive supply of
vacancies.
Proof: The equilibrium condition is of the form f(u) = constant where u is bounded
between 0 and 1, with f (0) = 0 and limu→1 f(u) = 2
3
√
2. Figure 2 shows that f (u)
is monotonically increasing so a unique interior equilibrium exists for suﬃciently low
K∗(K∗ < limu→1 f(u)).  
The comparative statics of the model are the same as when β > 0 and ψ = 0 as represented
in Table 1. We refer to Appendix A.3 for details. The only diﬀerence is that x does not
change with κ and K. Again, the sign of the ﬁrst order derivatives of v with respect to
κ and γ are determined by the level of the unemployment rate. For low levels of u, the
ﬁrst order derivative with respect to κ is negative while it is positive for γ. For larger
values of u, we ﬁnd opposite signs. Again the turning point is at the same value for u for















Figure 2: The ﬁrst derivative of f(u).
3.3 Monopsony with on-the-job search less eﬃcient: 0 < ψ <
1,β = 0
The case where 0 < ψ < 1 complicates the analysis since the reservation wage is no longer
equal to the value of leisure because workers have to give up part of the option value of
search when accepting a job. Proposition 6 characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 For the case 0 < ψ < 1,β = 0, wages are given by:













































1 + z − 1




(ψ + z){z2 + (1 − ψ)log(1 + z)[log(1 + z) − 2z]}
3/2
Proof: See Appendix A.4. 
The proposition characterizes the equilibrium as a system of two implicit equations in x
and z. Since z is a continuous and monotonically declining function of u with z (1,ψ) = 0
and z (0,ψ) = ∞, any positive value of z implies a unique value of u. It turns out that
this transformation is convenient in all cases where on-the-job search is less eﬃcient then
oﬀ-the-job search, 0 < ψ < 1. Hence, it will be applied throughout the paper. The ﬁrst
relation reﬂects labor supply: the more jobs are opened, the lower the unemployment
rate u (the higher z), the stronger the bargaining position of workers, the more choosy
they are and therefore the lower is x. The second relation reﬂects labor demand. The
right-hand side of the second line of equation (21) is the same as the previous equations
for unemployment (15), and (19). Proposition 7 states that the right-hand side converges
to the special cases ψ = 0 and ψ = 1 discussed in the previous sections:
Proposition 7 The limits of Q(ψ 1−u





































These limits satisfy equation (15) and (19) respectively.
Proof: See appendix A.5. 
The next proposition shows uniqueness and provides conditions for existence of the equi-
librium.





ψ there exists a unique equilibrium with a positive
supply of vacancies.
Proof: See Appendix A.6. 
20We show in the appendix that Qz < 0 for any level of 0 < ψ < 1. This implies that
dQ(ψ 1−u
u ,ψ) > 0 and hence unemployment increases with γ, K and B and it deceases
with κ. The other comparative statics, as derived in the previous sections, are very hard
to derive for the present case. Proposition 7 in combination with the results derived in the
previous sections suggest that the results should be qualitatively the same. This implies
that the signs of the derivatives of v and x remain the same.
4 Welfare and the cost of search
In a world with search frictions, output is lower than it would be in a Walrasian world
without search frictions. This section analyses the magnitude of the cost of search, deﬁned
as the relative loss in output compared to the frictionless equilibrium. We show that
minimizing the cost of search is equivalent to maximizing the asset value of unemployment,
V U.
There are two reasons why search frictions reduce output. First, the constraints im-
posed by the search technology cause unemployment mismatch and costly vacancy cre-
ation. This loss can only be reduced by a more eﬃcient search technology. Second, output
is lost due to ineﬃcient decentralized decision making given the constraints of the search
technology. Below, we decompose the cost of search in these two parts and suggest insti-
tutional remedies to reduce the second part, like changing workers’ bargaining power β
or introducing unemployment insurance, so that agents’ decisions are better aligned. An-
other way to decompose the cost of search is by its three technical components: foregone
production due to unemployment, the cost of maintaining vacancies, and the productiv-
ity loss due to suboptimal assignment. This decomposition is particularly important for
empirical inference on the cost of search. Whether or not one allows for on-the-job search
matters a lot for this exercise.
4.1 The cost of search and the asset value of unemployment
In a frictionless economy, all workers are assigned to their optimal job where they produce
Y (0) = 1. Since labor supply is normalized to one, this is equal to total output. We deﬁne
the cost of search X as the loss in current output relative to this ﬁrst best outcome. Since
the ﬁrst best outcome is normalized to one, the absolute cost is equal to the relative cost.
Hence, we focus on the absolute cost. This cost is equal to the sum of its three technical
21components, unemployment, vacancies, and suboptimal assignment:
X ≡ 1 −
Z x
0
Y (x)Ex (x)dx − uB + vK (22)
where Ex(x) is the absolute value of the ﬁrst order derivative of E(x). This function is the
density function of workers that work at distance x from their optimal assignment. The
ﬁrst term is ﬁrst best output, while the second term is actual output. The diﬀerence is
the cost of suboptimal assignment plus the output loss due to unemployment. However,
unemployed job seekers do enjoy leisure, which is captured by the third term. The fourth








Substitution of this equation together with equation (9) yields an expression for X as a
function of the acceptance rule x and unemployment u, or alternatively using z as deﬁned
in the previous section:
X (x,u) = −γx
2z + ψ − 1






















where we omit the arguments of z (u,ψ) for the sake of convenience. Note that this
expression depends only on technical constraints, not on decision rules. Hence, a social
planner can never do better than maximizing this expression. The subsequent proposition
relates this expression for the cost of search to the asset value of unemployment in the
decentralized equilibrium.
Proposition 9 If x and u satisfy the decentralized equilibrium of Proposition 6, then:
X (x,u) = 1 − ρV
U
Proof: See Appendix A.7.  
In other words, if we restrict ourselves to the market outcome, then maximizing the asset
value of unemployment is equivalent to minimizing the cost of search. This conclusion
deviates from the standard result in search models where unemployment carries a greater
weight in the asset value of the unemployed than in current output, since the unemployed
22have to pay the full cost of current unemployment while the future revenues of employment
must be discounted. The reason that this problem does not show up here is the golden
growth assumption, which sets the worker’s discount rate equal to the growth rate of
the labor force. Current output is the result of earlier search eﬀort of older and smaller
generations of job seekers. Hence current output is less than the output that is to be
expected from current search eﬀort. In this way, the composition of current output exactly
accounts for the discounting of future output by today’s job seekers. This feature simpliﬁes
our welfare analysis considerably. We can just maximize the asset value of unemployment
V U or minimize the cost of search X (x,u) in the steady state here. This is what we do
in the subsequent analysis.
4.2 Welfare analysis
Given the constraints imposed on X by the search technology, the market outcome de-
pends on three types of decisions: (1) the number of vacancies v opened by ﬁrms, (2)
the job acceptance rule x applied by unemployed job seekers, and (3) the job acceptance
rule applied by employed workers. The latter decision rule is simple: employed workers
accept any job oﬀer that is at shorter distance from the optimal assignment than their
present job. This decision rule is clearly eﬃcient, since there is no option value lost by
switching to a more productive job, neither for the worker, nor for the ﬁrm. Since this
rule is eﬃcient, a social planner will not change it. This leaves the social planner with
two decision variables, x and v. Since equation (9) provides the steady-state relation
conditional on the degree of search frictions between v on the one hand and x and u on
the other hand, we can just as well use the latter two as the relevant decision variables.
The social planner’s ﬁrst best optimum minimizes X (x,u) with respect to x and u.8 For
the general case this expression is hard to evaluate. However, for the special case that
on- and oﬀ-the-job search are equally eﬃcient, ψ = 1, we can again beneﬁt from the fact
that accepting a job yields no loss in the option of obtaining an even better job, so that
x =
√
























Minimizing this expression with respect to u yields an implicit equation for the ﬁrst best
level of unemployment, u∗:
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Note that the right-hand side of this expression is equal to the right-hand side of the
market equilibrium in Proposition 4. Hence, we are able to compare the unemployment
rate of the social planner with the rate achieved in a decentralized economy with β = 0
and ψ = 0 just by comparing the left-hand side expressions. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
The upper curve is the decentralized equilibrium in equation (19), the lower curve is the
unemployment rate preferred by the social planner in equation (26), both as a function
of the expression on the left-hand side. We come to the following conclusion.
Corollary 10 Unemployment is too low in the decentralized equilibrium, implying that
the number of vacancies is too high.
Taking a natural rate of 5% as benchmark, unemployment should be about 25% higher
than it is in the decentralized equilibrium with β = 0.
Why is unemployment too low in the decentralized equilibrium? As a benchmark for
the subsequent discussion it is useful to brieﬂy discuss the conclusion of Teulings and
Gautier (2004) for the case with Nash bargaining and no on-the-job search, ψ = 0,0 <
24β < 1. In that case, workers accept too many job oﬀers. Since there is no on-the-job
search, unemployed job seekers lose their full option value of search when accepting a
job. Hence, their reservation wage is equal to the ﬂow value of unemployment, which
is the sum of the value of leisure and the option value of search. Alternatively, this
can be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that the bargaining outcome is on the
Pareto frontier and leaves no gains from unexploited trade. Hence, if the ﬂow value of
unemployment is ﬁrst best, the acceptance rule is also ﬁrst best. If not, job seekers and
ﬁrms match too easily, so x is above ﬁrst best. The quadratic contact technology implies
the absence of negative congestion externalities both at the ﬁrm and the worker side of
the market, only thick market externalities are relevant. Therefore, both the ﬁrm and the
employer should get the full surplus of the match, which is obviously infeasible. Hence,
ﬁrms create too few vacancies, the value of unemployment is below ﬁrst best and matches
are formed too easily. The only way to restore eﬃciency in a decentralized equilibrium
is an unemployment insurance that pays workers the ﬁrst best value of unemployment
in combination with giving ﬁrms full bargaining power, β → 0, so that they are able to
capture the full match surplus. In the absence of unemployment insurance, β = 1/2 is
the second best outcome. If β → 0 without unemployment insurance, then ﬁrms capture
the full match surplus. Due to free entry, ﬁrms invest that entire surplus in the creation
of new vacancies, such that workers end up with just the value of leisure.
With on- and oﬀ-the-job search being equally eﬃcient, ψ = 1, unemployed job seekers
do not lose any option value by accepting a job. Hence, they are prepared to accept any job
that pays more than the value of leisure, B. This is also the eﬃcient outcome, since there
is no option value of search at stake. As before, there are no congestion eﬀects, ruling out
negative search externalities. However, the split of the match surplus is entirely diﬀerent
from the model without on-the-job search and 0 < β < 1, for three reasons. First, we
assume monopsonistic wage formation, β = 0, which gives ﬁrms a large share of the
surplus. Second, the acceptance rule x is less strict with than without on-the-job search
(since with on-the-job search there is no option value lost). This reduces the reservation
wage and shifts surplus to the ﬁrm. Third, on-the-job search introduces competition
between ﬁrms for workers, which pushes up wages. This reduces the ﬁrm’s share in the
surplus. We provided a graphical illustration of these diﬀerences in Figure 1. These three
forces simultaneously make the share of the surplus for the ﬁrms too large. They create
more vacancies than is eﬃcient. The intuition behind the ineﬃciency is that there is a
25poaching externality. A ﬁrm that opens a vacancy does not adequately internalize the
output loss it imposes on another ﬁrm when it poaches a worker. Though the job move
itself is eﬃcient, its welfare gain is too small to justify the cost of opening a vacancy.
Note that this externality is diﬀerent from the standard poaching externality which is
driven by investments in human capital, i.e. Moen and Rosen (2004). Poaching can
reduce investments in human capital because parts of the returns to those investments
go to future employers. In our model we have no investments in human capital but
the equilibrium is still not eﬃcient. Our ﬁnding is related to the ”business-stealing”
externality in for example Salop (1979) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In these models
economics of scale are not optimally exploited. In our setting, the expected private beneﬁts
of opening a vacancy are higher than the social beneﬁts. Note that this result is based on
the assumption that ﬁrms have all the bargaining power. Proposition 11 shows that the
”business-stealing” externality need no longer exist whenever we change the bargaining
power.
Proposition 11 For ψ = 1, there exists a unique value of β ∈ (0,1) for which the
decentralized unemployment rate is equal to the social planner’s optimum.
Proof: We already showed that unemployment is too low for β = 0. For β = 1, workers
receive the full match surplus. This drives the number of vacancies to zero and unem-
ployment to unity, which is obviously too high. Now consider the zero proﬁt condition








Since x does not depend on β for ψ = 1 and since W(x) is determined by (5), which
is continuous in β, vacancy supply is continuous in β. By the continuity of vacancy
supply in β, there must be an intermediate value for β for which the unemployment
rate is equal to the social planner’s optimum. Uniqueness is a direct result of Wx(x)
being a decreasing function of β, see (5), and together with (6), this implies that for any
x < x,∂W(x)/∂β > 0. Hence, vacancy supply decreases with β. 
The optimal value of β can be calculated in the following way. First, we calculate the















                                                                                           
 








0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
β
K∗
Figure 5: The optimal level of β for diﬀerent values of K∗.
27the level of β that yields this desired number of vacancies, where we use (1) and (11). We
let K∗ run from 0 to 0.9. Figure 4 shows the actual and optimal vacancy stock. Both
increase with K∗ initially and start to decrease when K∗ becomes larger. This eﬀect
was already described in subsection 3.2, but as we show here also applies for the social
planner.9 The turning point of the social planner lies to the right from the turning point
of the market. Figure 5 shows that the level of β needed to oﬀset the ”business-stealing”
externality is quite large. The lower K∗, the higher the required value of β, since most
workers are already close to the optimal assignment, and hence the ”business-stealing”
externality is large. The optimal level of β can be even larger than 0.5, which is the
optimal level for the case without on-the-job search, 0 < β < 1,ψ = 0.
A formal welfare analysis for the intermediate case, 0 < ψ < 1, is complicated. How-
ever, given the continuity of the equilibrium in ψ and β, the conclusion from this analysis
is obvious. For small ψ (little on-the-job search), there is too little search and unem-
ployment and the number of vacancies is too low. Raising β does not oﬀer a solution,
since there is simply too little surplus to reward both job seekers and ﬁrms according to
their marginal contribution to the search process, unless one can combine unemployment
insurance and a large bargaining power for the ﬁrm. Without unemployment insurance,
β should be typically about a half. For high ψ (on-the-job search highly eﬀective), ﬁrst
best can be attained. That requires that β > 0. Even for ψ = 1, the optimal value of β
is again close to one half for reasonable values of K∗.
The previous analysis has shown that raising β above zero raises eﬃciency by reducing
the incentives to create vacancies. However, if the social planner has no instrument to
change workers’ bargaining power, the introduction of unemployment insurance can be
an alternative. From the outset we can see that this instrument can never implement ﬁrst
best because it distorts the job acceptance decision by a moral hazard problem: workers
reject all jobs that pay less than the value of leisure plus the unemployment beneﬁt, while
the eﬃcient rule would be to reject only jobs that pay less than the value of leisure.
Since we consider the decentralized equilibrium, equation (25) applies. For the sake of
simplicity, we concentrate on the case that the value of leisure is equal to zero, so that we
can interpret B as an unemployment beneﬁt. In that case, a term uB should be added to




+ uB subject to equation
(18).
9A formal proof of this is similar to the one described earlier in the paper.
28Proposition 12 The optimal level of UI beneﬁts for the case ψ = 1,β = 0 is positive,
B > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.8. 
We are not the ﬁrst to argue that even under risk neutrality there is a welfare improving
role for UI beneﬁts. Burdett (1979), Diamond (1981), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and
Teulings and Gautier (2004) all argue that UI beneﬁts can serve as a search subsidy
that prevents workers to stop searching too soon. Here we give a diﬀerent argument,
namely that unemployment insurance reduces the business-stealing externality that leads
to excess vacancy supply by raising the reservation wage of the worker.
4.3 The cost of search by its three components
The cost of search X can also be decomposed by its three technical components, unem-
ployment, the cost of vacancies, and the productivity loss due to a suboptimal assignment.
Such a decomposition is useful for empirical inference on the empirical magnitude of search
frictions. For example, Teulings and Gautier (2004) provided an approximate decompo-
sition of the cost of search for the case of Nash bargaining and without on-the-job search,











K ∼ = 3E[1 − Y (x)|x ≤ x]
where we use Y (0) = 1. This decomposition allows one to estimate the cost of search
from unemployment data. E.g., if the value of leisure B = 0, the bargaining power
of workers β = 1
2, then the cost of search X is three times the unemployment rate
u. A natural unemployment rate of about 5% implies the cost of search to be 15%.
However, there is an alternative way to estimate X, namely by the average wage loss
among employed workers relative to their wage in the optimal assignment. Since workers
receive a share β of the value of output above the output in the marginal acceptable job
type, W (x) − W (x) = β [Y (x) − Y (x)], the mean wage loss compared to the wage in
the optimal assignment is:




29This equality follows directly from the wage setting relationship: W (0) − W (x) =
β [1 − Y (x)]. Gautier and Teulings (2004) use standard human capital variables and occu-
pation and industry dummies to obtain an estimate of the mismatch indicator x. Applying
this indicator in a wage regression yields an estimate of E[W (0) − W (x)|x ≤ x] ∼ = 5% .
Setting β = 1
2, this method yields a higher value of the cost of search, X ∼ = 25%, than
the estimate of X derived from the unemployment rate. These conﬂicting estimates can
be viewed as a rejection of the model without on-the-job search by the data.
On-the-job search oﬀers a solution for this contradiction. For the case with on-the-job
search and monopsonistic wage setting, 0 < ψ ≤ 1,β = 0, the following expressions for
the expected wage loss compared to the wage in the ﬁrst best assignment and the cost of
search can be derived, see Appendix A.9:
E[W (0) − W (x)|x ≤ x] = (1 − B)
ψ
z
2(2 + z)z log(1 + z) − 3z2 − (1 + z)log
2 (1 + z)
z2 + (1 − ψ)log(1 + z)[log(1 + z) − 2z]
(28)
X = (1 − B)ψ
log(1 + z)[2z − log(1 + z)]
z2 + (1 − ψ)log(1 + z)[log(1 + z) − 2z]
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Note that the second term in parentheses of the denominator of the ﬁrst line is of higher
order. Hence, this term can be dropped without changing the order of the approximation.
However, as we show in Figures 6 and 7, the extra term makes an important improvement
in the speed of convergence. Remarkably, according to those approximations, the relation
between the cost of search and the mean wage loss relative to the wage in the optimal
assignment on the one hand and the unemployment rate on the other hand do not depend
on ψ. Second, the mean wage loss is larger than the cost of search. For an unemployment
rate of 5%, the ﬁrst is about 30% while the second is 15% .
Table 2 summarizes our ﬁndings for the models with and without on-the-job search.
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Figure 6: E[W (0) − W (x)|x ≤ x] and X and their approximations evaluated at various
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Figure 7: E[W (0) − W (x)|x ≤ x] and X and their approximations evaluated at various
levels of u for ψ = 1.
31loss compared to the wage in the optimal assignment are more robust than estimates
from the unemployment rates because the latter require a stance on the value of B, while
the former does not. Second, the ratio of the mean wage loss compared to the wage in
the optimal assignment and the unemployment rate is higher in a world with on-the-job
search. The diﬀerence can be as high as a factor 6 when the unemployment rate equals
5 percent. Finally, note that these relations hold only approximately. This can be seen
immediately, by letting β → 0 in the ﬁrst column and by letting ψ → 0 in the second
column (which is irrelevant, since ψ does not enter the relevant expressions). These limits
are not equal even though they approximate the same situation.10
Table 2: Representation of the diﬀerences in the cost of search for the oﬀ- and on-the-job
search model.























One important conclusion to draw from this Table is that if one wants to estimate X
from u, then allowing for on-the-job-search gives substantially larger estimates, especially
when u is low. Therefore, on-the-job-search can - compared to the situation without on-
the-job search - bridge the gap between the independent estimates of X based on wage
and unemployment data.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we characterize the equilibrium of a model with a continuum of job and
worker types, search frictions, transferable utility and free entry, allowing for on-the-job
search. On-the-job search has implications for (i) wage bargaining, (ii) entry of vacancies,
and (iii) the value of unemployment relative to employment. We derived the total output
losses due to the existence of search frictions and show that those losses are equal to
10The reason is that for both columns the limits are degenerate. This can be seen as follows, for
column 1, compare equation (15); for column 2, taking a limit to an ever increasing eﬃciency of the
search process (which is what we do when considering u → 0 for the approximate relations in Table 1)
implies that on-the-job search will dominate oﬀ-the-job search in the end; only by setting ψ = 0, this
mechanism breaks down.
32the diﬀerence between the reservation wage in the optimal assignment and the actual
reservation wage. Teulings and Gautier (2004) derived in a model without on-the-job
search that for equal bargaining power and no on-the-job search, this cost of search is
about three times the unemployment rate which is lower than direct estimates suggest.
Here, we show that although on-the-job search reduces the total welfare loss due to search
frictions it increases the diﬀerence between the lowest and the highest possible wage for
a given skill type. So allowing for on-the-job-search bridges the gap between the two
independent methods to calculate the cost of search. In addition, we show that the number
of vacancies is higher and the unemployment rate is lower than in the social optimum.
This is due to a business-stealing externality: in a market with on-the-job search an
individual ﬁrm does not fully internalize that opening a vacancy reduces expected job
durations at other matches. For reasonable parameter values this externality turns out
to be substantial. Positive unemployment beneﬁts can improve eﬃciency.
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34Appendix
A Derivations and proofs
A.1 Derivation of equation (4)




ρ + δ + 2ψλvx

















(ρ + δ + 2ψλvz)
2dz + C0
Substitution of x = 0 yields:







Substitution of this into the solution of the diﬀerential equation yields the desired expression. 
A.2 Comparative statics results for the case β > 0,ψ = 0
Since the left-hand side of (15) is monotonically increasing in u, the comparative statics con-
clusions follow straightforwardly. Substitution of (16) in (11) and some rearrangement of terms
yields ￿

















5 = 0 (29)
The relationship between x and the exogenous parameters of the model can be derived by total
diﬀerentiation of this equation. Total diﬀerentiation of equation (15). Taking total derivatives,










3u + 2β (1 − u)
u(3 − 2β) + 5β





The sign of this relationship depends on the sign of 3u2 −2(1 − u)
2 β. Because of the positive
relationship between K∗ and u discussed above, this implies that for low levels of K∗ an increase
35in this parameter induces a decrease in the number of vacancies whereas such an increase has a
positive impact on vacancies when K∗ is high. Using the same techniques, we can derive that








Hence, both derivatives have opposite sign. 
A.3 Comparative statics results for the case β = 0,ψ = 1
Consider second line of the equilibrium condition (18). We have: x =
√
B∗. Total diﬀerentiation
of the second equation in the market equilibrium of Proposition 4 yields the partial derivatives




logu(2u + 1 − u2 + ulogu) + 2(1 − u)
κ2xu2f′(u)(1 − u)
The sign of this relationship depends on the sign of logu(2u + 1 − u2 + ulogu) + 2(1 − u).
This function can be plotted for various values of u. It is negative for small values of u and
positive for larger values. The function has a single root at u = 27%. Hence, there is a
non-monotonic relationship between v and κ. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
For β = 0, equation (5) simpliﬁes to:
Wx (x) = −κψv
1 − 1
2γx2 − W (x)
1 + ψκvx
This can be rewritten as:

































+ c(1 + ψκvx)
Solving c from the initial condition for W (x), equation (6) yields:













Substitution of this relation for wages in equation (8) and (11), solving the integrals, and sub-
stitution of κvx for (1 − u)/u, see equation (9), proves the Proposition. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 7









1 + z − 1













z2 + (1 − ψ)log(1 + z)[log(1 + z) − 2z]
￿3/2
These limits can be calculated by substitution of z =ψ(1−u)/u and using l’Hopitals’ rule. The
result follows from substitution of these results into the total limit above.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 8
Since z is a continuous and monotonic declining function of u with z (1,ψ) = 0and z (0,ψ) =




























                                                             
                                                          
 
                                                          
 
                                                          
 
                                                          
                                                           
                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            
                                                            




Figure 8: Qz evaluated at various levels of u and ψ.
Hence, we have to show that Qz (z,ψ) < 0. Since dz









> 0 for the relevant domain u × ψ = [0,1] × [0,1].We provide a plot in
Figure 8.  
A.7 Proof of Proposition 9
Substitution of equation (20) in equation (30) and solving the integrals yields:
ρV





























where we substitute v for equation (9) and z ≡ ψ 1−u
u in the second line. Using the ﬁrst line of

























2dx − uB + vK













Solving for the integral and substitution of the deﬁnition of u and z yields:

































log(1 + z) − 2
￿￿






























This proofs the proposition. 
A.8 Proof of Proposition (12)
The second best level of unemployment insurance maximizes the right hand side of equation
(25) with respect to B and subject to equation (18). In order to derive the ﬁrst order condition
we need to derive the relationship between uand B. This relationship can be derived from the
second equilibrium condition in Proposition 4. Taking total derivatives and using the deﬁnition






















































Note that the expression for dX+/dB in equation (31) depends only on u and B and is a
continuous function of both variables. Due to the continuity, a proof that a positive level of
B increases welfare is the same as showing that dX+/dB is positive when evaluated at zero.


















dB evaluated at B = 0 for various values of u.
A.9 Proof of equation (28)
We have:
E[W (0) − W (x)|x ≦ x] =
Z x
0




where Ex (x)is deﬁned in equation (23). The division by E (0)corrects for the unemployed.
Equation (20) implies:





[1 + log(1 + ψκvx)] −
1
2
x(x − 2x) +
1 + ψκvx
ψ2κ2v2 log(1 + ψκvx)
￿







































ψκvx log2(1 + ψκvx)
)
= γu
u + ψ (1 − u)




















Using the deﬁnition of z we ﬁnd the ﬁrst equation of (5). Substitution of the two equations (21)
in equation (24) yields the second equation. 
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